Git on AI Steroids: GitHub Agentic Workflows
Table of Contents
- The thing I did not want to do
- Enter gh-aw
- Five workflows, one that runs itself
- How a run is wired
- The workflow file, in full
- PR #8: a hidden proxy endpoint
- What the run looked like
- The review it posted
- A finding is a challenge, not a verdict
- The rate-limiter that is not a bug
- The blocklist claim that is wrong in a detail
- The firewall that fails silently
- Asking it to fix something, without letting it
- Pairing it with cybersecurity skills
- How the agent picks its skills
- What the framework gets right
- Security considerations
- The trust boundary, drawn
- The prompt-injection threat model
- Turning it off
- Cost and observability
- Conclusion
- Reflections
- Why an LLM here, and not just more CI
- The gaps that still bother me
- What is still missing
Well, here we are: I wanted a second reviewer on every pull request, a sanity pass on every failed pipeline, and a monthly security sweep, and I was not willing to hand a language model a write token to get any of it.









